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Introduction
Economists have long been interested in how managers might use incentive pay to increase worker output. Recently, interest has focused more broadly on the role of human resource management and, specifically, on management practices (for an overview see . It is argued that there are good and bad management practices and there is growing evidence that differences in managerial practices explain part of the long-standing heterogeneity between firms in performance (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007 , Black and Lynch 2001 .
Work to date has focused primarily on the for-profit sector. Less attention has been paid to management practices in the not-for-profit sector or how they compare, both in terms of their quality and their importance in terms of driving performance, with the for-profit sector. This seems important to look at as there are reasons to expect differences between the two sectors.
First, there may be differences in the quality of the people the two sectors can attract for managerial positions which may impact directly on management quality. Second, there may be differences in the motivation of managers and workers (and in particular the degree of altruism) that may affect the importance of management practices for outcomes in the two sectors. For example, Besley and Ghatak (2005) show that impure altruism in workers leads to sorting across mission-and non-mission oriented firms and that the use of high-powered incentives are less appropriate in mission-oriented firms. Similarly, the presence of impure altruism may mean that management practices do not have the same bite in the not-for-profit sector as in the for-profit sector. This is the focus of the present paper. We make two contributions. First, we develop a simple model that is able to explain why differences in management quality can persist between forprofit and not-for-profit organizations even when they are competing within the same industry.
Second, we use unique survey data to make a direct comparison of management practices in the not-for-profit (NFP) and for-profit (FP) sectors and the link between these and objective measures of outcomes in the two sectors.
Our model revolves around agents' choice of setting up a FP or NFP organization in a market for some (quasi-) public good or social service. Following Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) , the only difference between the two types of organizations is the limited ability of NFP entrepreneurs to distribute profits to themselves. In NFP organizations, a part of profits is retained by the organization and contributes to the organization's social objectives (e.g., making charitable donations, giving discounts to poor clients, and so on). Agents in our model differ in two ways, managerial ability and altruism, which are both private knowledge. Following Bénabou and Tirole (2006) , we assume that agents are concerned about their social status for being altruistic; setting up a NFP can function as a signal of altruism. We show that agents who decide to set up a NFP organization will be drawn from the top of the altruism distribution and the bottom of the managerial ability distribution. The reason is simple: switching to NFP status imposes a constraint on the distribution of profits to the agent, which is more costly for high-ability agents who achieve higher profits.
Despite the negative sorting of managerial talent, NFP organizations may not necessarily achieve lower output (broadly defined) because of the use of retained profits to further the organization's objectives. This works to increase output and can counterbalance the output effect of lower managerial ability. The implication is that NFP managers will never be as management savvy, but that this may matter less in terms of outcomes.
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Our empirical findings support this model. To measure management quality we use the management practice instrument developed by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and apply it to two industries in the UK in which NFPs operate widely and compete with FPs. We compare the management practice scores (which capture management quality) in NFPs and FPs in a sample of around 160 firms in the nursing home and fostering/adoption agency industries and we examine the relationship between management practice scores and outcomes for the two sectors.
2 Relatedly, Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) develop a model of self-selection of managers into public and private sector organizations where managers differ in ability and public service motivation (see also Bond and Glode 2011) . Bandiera et al. (2010) study sorting of managers into family firms and firms with distributed ownership, assuming that the owners of family firms derive utility from exercising power. In contrast to these papers, differences in nonpecuniary utility between organizational forms arise endogenously in our model.
Our results confirm previous findings for FP firms -better management practices (i.e. higher management practice scores) are associated with better outcomes. But we find interesting differences between FPs and NFPs. Consistent with our model, we find that NFPs score lower than FPs on the overall management practices score (although this difference is small and not statistically significant). We do find, however, a significant difference on a key dimension of management practices -NFPs score lower in terms of use of incentives. When we examine the relationship between managerial practices and the quality of output, as measured directly by scores allocated by independent public regulators of these industries, we find that these poorer managerial practices do not map directly onto lower quality of output in the NFP sector, in contrast with the findings for the FP sector.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our basic model. In section 3 we analyze the model and describe the key theoretical results. Section 4 describes the organizations in our sample and the management practice survey. Section 5 presents the main empirical findings. Section 6 presents our conclusions.
The model
We consider the choice of agents to set up a FP or a NFP organization in a market for some (quasi-) public good or social service. Following Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) , the only difference between the two types of organizations is the limited ability of NFP entrepreneurs to distribute profits to themselves. Specifically, while agents running a for-profit organization are full residual claimants, we shall suppose that, if an agent sets up a NFP organization, he earns a share 0 < β < 1 of profits. The remaining share of profits (1-β) is retained by the organization and used to further contribute to the organization's social objectives (e.g., making charitable donations, giving discounts to poor clients, and so on).
Agents in our economy differ in two respects: managerial ability (α i ) and impure altruism (γ i ).
Both are agents' private knowledge. The density of the joint distribution of α i and γ i is common knowledge and described by f (α,γ) Managerial ability determines the productivity and, hence, profits of an organization. We simply assume that output of an organization is given by q(α i ), where the function q(α i ) is increasing. Profits are described by the function π (α i ), which is also increasing.
Altruistic agents care about the contribution they make to the delivery of (quasi-) public goods or social services. Altruism is impure in that agents care about how much they personally contribute, not about the total level of public goods or social services provided in the Lastly note that the linearity of the utility function implies that any agent with γ i < 1 strictly prefers private spending to making charitable donations out of distributed profits. Hence, in the analysis below, we can safely ignore decisions taken on private charitable contributions as distributed profits will be optimally spend entirely on private consumption. Moreover, it implies that the NFP status is a binding constraint on distributing profits for all agents except those with maximum altruistic preferences .
Analysis
Each agent decides whether to set up a FP or NFP organization. When setting up a FP organization, an agent's payoff is:
.
When setting up a NFP organization, an agent's payoff is:
For given beliefs and an agent is indifferent between setting up a FP and a NFP organization when the expressions in (1) and (2) are equal. After some rearrangements, we obtain:
where the first term describes the agent's income loss when choosing NFP, the second term describes the utility gain from contributing more to the public good through retained profits when choosing NFP, and the third term describes the status gain or loss from choosing NFP.
Notice that the first two terms are negative in sum for all agents with . That is, although agents enjoy making contributions, their altruism is not sufficiently strong to make up for the decrease in private consumption. Hence, without any status gains , none of the agents would strictly prefer setting up a NFP organization to setting up a FP organization.
It is also clear from (3) that, for given beliefs and the sum of gains and losses from setting up a NFP organization strictly increases with γ i .The reason is clear. NFP status imposes that part of the profits is used to make further contributions to the public good rather than is distributed to the agent, which is less costly for agents who attach a greater value to making such contributions.
The reverse holds for agent's managerial ability. For given beliefs and the sum of gains and losses from setting up a NFP organization strictly decreases with α ι . Intuitively, setting up a NFP organization implies giving up a share (1-β) of profits, which is more costly for highly able agents as they achieve higher profits.
The above observations suggest that, if some agents decide to set up a NFP organization, these agents will be drawn from the top of the altruism distribution and the bottom of the managerial ability distribution. Proposition 1 shows that this is indeed the case. 
which is strictly increasing in α and approaches one when α goes to infinity. All agents with strictly prefer NFP status, while the remainder (at least weakly) prefers FP status. In equilibrium, beliefs follow from Bayes' Rule. Hence:
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is given by the solution to (4), (5), and (6). It is straightforward to show that if γ and α are uniformly distributed, a solution exists and is unique. ■ 
Proposition 1 has a clear testable implication. In a market where both FP and NFP organizations are active, we would expect average managerial ability to be higher in FP organizations. The reason is simple: switching to NFP status imposes a constraint on the distribution of profits to the agent, which is more costly for agents who achieve higher profits. The theory has less clear predictions for the relation between an organization's status and total output, broadly defined.
While NFPs may achieve lower output as a result of the negative sorting of managerial ability, the use of retained profits to further the organization's objectives may imply that NFP organizations reach higher output. In the rest of the paper we explore how these dimensions of management (both quality and the importance for outputs) compare across the two sectors in practice.
Management practices survey

The organizations
We collected detailed information on management practices from more than 200 fostering/adoption agencies and nursing care homes. These represent the two largest industries within residential social care in the UK. Both agencies and homes operate in competitive, market-driven environments, composed of a mix of FP and NFP organizations that directly compete against each other either for business from local government children's services in the case of fostering agencies or from consumers in the case of care homes.
The prevalence of the different sectors (including the public sector) in the two industries is shown in Table 1 below. The three sectors -public, FP and NFP -are fairly equally represented among fostering/ adoption agencies, and this is broadly reflected in our sample, but we focus on FPs and NFPs because public sector agencies play a different role in that they have primary responsibility for placing all children in care. Thus while public agencies directly compete with FP and NFP agencies to recruit carers, they do not compete directly for business in terms of placing children. All three sectors are also present in the care homes industry and all directly compete for customers but there are very few public sector care homes in the population and in our sample (we deliberately over-sampled NFP homes in order to achieve a reasonable sub-sample size). is not the case that either provider type is concentrated in a particular location.
The management practices survey
To measure the quality of management practices we use an existing methodology that has been used in manufacturing (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007) and health .
Using an existing methodology has a number of advantages. First, the survey has been extensively tried and tested, successfully being used to survey several thousands of organizations in more than 20 different countries. Second, following the same methodology and using a common set of indicators allows us to set our results in a wider context.
At the core of the Bloom and Van Reenen survey is a set of 18 indicators of management practices, grouped into four subcategories:
• process management -two indicators assessing whether processes are standardized and are being continuously improved;
• use of monitoring -four indicators on the extent to which performance is tracked and monitored within the organizations and reviewed and followed with staff members;
• use of targets -six indicators covering target balance, inter-connection, horizon, stretch, clarity, comparability, and accountability;
• use of incentives -six indicators assessing the extent to which the organization rewards and promotes high performers and deals with poor performers and how the organisations manages, retains, and attracts talented individuals.
The first two indicators (and related questions) are fairly specific to each industry and required adaptation from the original survey to fostering/adoption agencies and care homes. The remaining 16 indicators (and associated questions) used to capture monitoring, targets, and incentives are more general and could be applied identically to fostering/adoption and care homes as in the earlier studies of manufacturing firms and hospitals. We therefore focus our analysis on these 16 indicators which are directly comparable with the earlier studies. Finally, the survey also collects some limited background information on each organization. that our responses should be broadly comparable with those for other sectors using the same methodology. All interviews were independently double-scored by two interviewers -one conducting the interview, the other listening in. Any differences in scores were then discussed and reconciled at the end of the interview. This double-scoring was to ensure that the interviews and scoring are comparable across interviewers, although our regression analysis additionally controls for interviewer fixed effects, as well as the time of day the interviews were done. Each interview took between 45 -60 minutes.
To ensure unbiased responses we used a double-blind survey methodology. Interviews were conducted by telephone without the respondents being aware in advance that they were being scored, making it more likely that the interviews genuinely captured actual management practices. The interviewers were also not told anything about the organization's performance (or sector) in advance of the interview and this was derived from independent sources post interview. Thus interviewers were not scoring in line with their perception of the quality of organization.
Results
1 Comparison with management practices across industries
The use of a similar survey tool to previous studies with a common set of core indicators allows us to make some high-level comparisons between management practice scores across industries. Using previous work in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and we can compare fostering/ adoption agencies and care homes with UK manufacturing firms and UK hospitals. We focus on the 16 individual indicators that are the most directly comparable across all the studies (covering monitoring, targets and incentives). Table 2 provides basic summary statistics, while Figure 2 shows the full distribution of scores for each industry. Average management practice scores for agencies and homes are slightly higher than those for the sample of manufacturing firms, and substantially higher than for hospitals.
The distribution of scores for agencies and homes is also much more compressed than that for both manufacturing firms and hospitals. Looking at Figure 2 , there are no agencies and homes with very low management practice scores; compared to manufacturing firms, there are also no stellar performers. Three-quarters of all homes and agencies receive an average management score between 2.5 and 3.5, compared to 58 per cent of manufacturing firms and half of all hospitals.
What could explain these differences in management practice scores across industries? We are confident that the difference is genuine and is not arising because of differences in methodology. The questions are almost identical to those used in the earlier studies and the interviewers for our survey were trained in interviewing and scoring by the manager of the LSE team and additionally did observations on interviews being conducted at the LSE to validate their scoring methodology.
It is clear from Table 2 that the organizations in our survey are much smaller than those in previous studies (as shown by the average number of employees), although Table 2 also shows that, at least among manufacturing firms, smaller firms typically score lower.
Another difference is that both the agencies and homes are subject to numerous regulations defining minimum standards for both processes and outcomes. Possibly harder to explain is why there are fewer high scorers among our sample of homes and agencies; it may suggest that, beyond a certain level, there is little or no return to investing in management practices in these industries.
Not for profit and for profit management compared
Before turning to regression analysis, where we can control for measurable differences in organization and manager characteristics, 6 we show the distribution of the overall management 5 For care homes and agencies these minimum standards cover training of staff and managers, information and records, and facilities and premises. 6 Table A1 provides descriptive statistics for organization and manager characteristics and potential outcomes separated by industry and sector. Not-for-profit organizations are typically smaller and, in the case of the care homes, the difference in means is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. A significantly higher proportion of managers are female in both not-for-profit agencies and homes but the manager's tenure in the post is similar in both sectors. The outcome indicators will be discussed in Section 5.3.
scores for the NFP and FP sectors in Figure 3 . 7 We use, as above, the 16 indicators which are consistent with the previous studies. 8 The figure shows that the bulk of the FP distribution lies above that of the NFP profits -more NFPs score in the range 2.5 -3.0 than FPs firms. However, FPs are also the worst performers.
To test for significant differences in mean management practice scores across sectors, conditional on other characteristics, we run simple regressions of the following form:
where M i is the management practices score (overall and for the sub-groups of indicators), included as a z-score, so the differences are measured in standard deviations. For each score, we include a set of noise controls (X 1i ), including interviewer fixed effects and time of interview, and controls for organization and manager characteristics (X 2i ) as the firms in the two sectors differ in terms of staffing and size. These control variables include an indicator for whether or not the manager is female and tenure in post (in years), the number of staff in the organization, and an indicator for whether the manager reports that the organization is part of a network, which is also likely to reflect the size of the organization beyond the immediate home/ agency. Summary statistics on these control variables are given in Table A1 in the Appendix.
We also include a measure of competition since competition has been shown to drive up management practice scores in the case of hospitals ). Of course, the level of competition may be endogenous -a well-managed organization may drive out poor performers in the local market. Unlike Bloom et al. we do not have a suitable instrument. We therefore are only identifying possible associations but, in particular, we are interested in whether the relationship between management scores and competition varies by sector. To measure competition we use an industry-specific z-score measure of the number of organizations within a 20 kilometre radius.
7 In our analysis of differences between the sectors, we pool observations from care homes and agencies. The advantage of this is that it increases the sample size. We have separately tested for -and rejected -significant differences between the sectors. 8 Results with the full 18 indicators are similar.
The final sample is not large (104 FPs and 61 NFPs) and, as already shown, there is also not a large degree of variation in the management scores across organizations (compared to the earlier manufacturing and hospital studies). Nevertheless, we do find some interesting -and statistically significant -results, summarized in Table 3 .
The first column of the table shows that NFPs score slightly lower than FPs on the overall management practices score. The difference is small (less than 0.05 of a standard deviation) and is not significant. NFPs score higher (but not significantly different) on the sub-group of indicators that capture monitoring (i.e. how performance is tracked and monitored within the organizations and reviewed and followed with staff members) and targets. But they score significantly lower on the sub-group of indicators that captures the use of incentives (the extent to which the organization rewards and promotes high performers and deals with poor performers and how the organization manages, retains, and attracts talented individuals). NFPs have scores on this indicator which are approximately one third of a standard deviation lower than FPs.
Within the group of indicators for incentives NFPs score significantly lower on three. These are "rewarding talent", i.e. whether good performance is financially rewarded within the organization (Coeff = -.597, SE = .211), "retaining talent", i.e. whether the organization goes out of its way to retain talent (Coeff = -.447, SE = .199) and "removing talent", i.e. whether and how the organization deals with under-performers (Coeff = -.404, SE = .205).
The results also indicate that larger organizations have higher management practice scores, consistent with earlier results, although the coefficient on number of staff is significant only for the overall score. But being in a network -which is also likely to reflect larger organizations -is associated with a significantly higher score on overall management practices and for the three sub-groups of indicators. Again, this is not evidence of a causal relationship. Better-managed organizations may grow and/or larger organizations may need stronger management practices in order to operate effectively.
We also find, again consistent with previous studies, that competition is associated with higher management practice scores among FPs . This is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for the overall management score and also for monitoring and incentives. The coefficient on the interaction term between competition and not-for-profit dummy status is almost always negative (although not significant), which may suggest that the positive relationship between the degree of competition and the management practices score is muted in the not-for-profit sector. However, the finding of no statistically significant difference is also consistent with the literature on the hospital industry in the USA showing that NFPs and FPs respond similarly to competition (e.g. Sloan 2000).
The relationship between management scores and outcomes
A common finding from previous studies of management practices in manufacturing and health is that the management scores are correlated with external indicators of performancemeasures of productivity in the case of manufacturing (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007) and mortality rates and regulatory ratings in the case of hospitals . While this is not necessarily a causal relationship (e.g. good organizations could invest in management practices), it indicates that the management practice scores "matter" in a meaningful way for performance -whether as a cause or a consequence.
In this section we examine whether this relationship also holds for not-for-profits. To explore the relationship between management practices and outcomes within and across sectors we use an externally validated measure of the quality of the organization. Both sets of organizations are regularly inspected and given a rating by an independent regulator. 9 One potential issue for our analysis is that there is little variation in the regulatory ratings. Both regulators use a four-point rating (excellent, good, adequate, inadequate) but nearly 60 per cent of the population are rated as good. In our sample there are no organizations that are rated as inadequate. In our analysis, we focus on two binary measures -being a low performer, defined as being rated as adequate, and being a high performer, defined as being rated as excellent. We also use staff turnover, collected as part of the interview, as another outcome indicator that may be impacted by management practices. This indicator is potentially ambiguous since turnover could be due to staff dissatisfaction (reflecting poor management) or the removal of poor performers (one of the indicators of good management in the survey). In practice, we find a strong negative correlation between whether members of staff have left and the regulatory rating (96 per cent of adequate performers had staff leave compared to 77 per cent of good and 76 per cent of excellent) suggesting that higher staff turnover is a negative outcome. Staff satisfaction has also been used by the regulator of health care in the UK as one indicator of good performance. 10 Summary statistics on the outcome variables are given in Table A1 in the Appendix.
To explore the relationship between management practices and observable outcomes across sectors, we run simple regressions of the following form:
where y i is the measure of outcomes -binary indicators for being rated adequate ("low performer"), being rated excellent ("high performer"), and experiencing staff turnover in the last 12 months ("staff turnover"). M is the overall management practices score (included as a zscore as before), which we interact with FP and NFP indicators to capture possible differences in the way in which management practices relate to observable outcomes across the two sectors. We also include a NFP indicator to capture any underlying difference in outcomes across the sectors. We estimate linear probability models for ease of interpreting the coefficients; the estimated marginal effects from estimating probit models are very similar to those reported in Table 4 . Table 4 shows that the results for FP organisations are consistent with earlier studies which find a positive association between good management and good performance. Among FPs a one standard deviation increase in the management practices score is correlated with a 13 percentage point reduction in the probability that the organization will be a low performer (statistically significant at the 10 per cent level). Looking across the sub-groups of indicators, the relationship is consistently negative with the strongest and most significant relationship for the monitoring indicators. There is less of a strong relationship for FPs between the management score and the probability of being a high performer but in all cases the coefficient is positive, though not statistically significant. There is also a consistently negative relationship between the management score and staff turnover (i.e. higher management scores are correlated with lower staff turnover), and this is statistically significant for both monitoring and targets.
However, the results also give some indication that the relationship between the management practices score and outcomes is different for NFPs. By contrast with FPs, there is a positive relationship between the overall score and the probability of being a poor performer and a negative relationship with the probability of being a high performer (although we cannot reject that the coefficients are the same for the two sectors). For the sub-groups of indicators, there is a significant negative association between the targets score and being a high performer. We also find a positive and significant relationship between the overall management practices score and the probability of staff having left in the previous 12 months among NFPs, which is significantly different from the FP sector. The coefficient on management sub-group scores in the staff turnover regression is positive and significant for monitoring, targets, and incentives.
Taken together, these results suggest that management practices that work for FPs may be less effective (or even counterproductive) in NFPs.
Conclusions
There is growing interest in the contribution to firm performance of management practices. This is the first study to focus on management in not-for-profits compared to for profit firms.
Our model shows that not-for-profit firms will attract lower ability managers, but output may not necessarily be lower because of higher levels of altruism. Our results provide some support for the idea that not-for-profits have lower managerial quality. We also find less of a strong relationship between management practices and outcomes in this sector. In fact, for some indicators, we find a negative relationship between performance and 'better' management practices.
11
We do not believe that our empirical results can be explained by anything distinctive about the industries we look at -indeed, the results for for-profit firms are in line with the previous empirical literature. Instead, our findings provide the first evidence that there are potentially real -and important -differences between management in the sectors. Specifically, they suggest that management may play less of an important role in driving performance in the notfor-profit sector than in the for-profit sector. While our sample sizes are small and limited to two service industries, this idea has wider support in a related literature on incentives and notfor-profits which also suggests that the use of incentives, widely shown in the for-profit sector to raise effort (e.g. Bandiera et al. 2010 ) may be less cost-effective where workers are motivated by altruism (Besley and Ghatak 2005) .
11 Our findings that the quality of workers does not translate into poorer output differs from Bandiera et al. (2010) who integrate selection of workers and incentive structures within a single model and empirically examine the differences between family firms and firms with distributed ownership. They find that family firms optimally offer less incentive pay, lower overall pay, and attract lower quality workers but also make lower profit. They do not, however, examine differences by for-profit status and the workers in their model do not have altruism to offset lower ability. Stephan et al. (2011) look at social enterprises, some of which may be not-for-profit and some not. Also in contrast to our paper, they find that better management practices do lead to better performance in these organizations. However, they use a different measure of management practices and use balance sheet information to assess performance. In the case of not for profits which have a non-distribution constraint, balance sheet performance may not be a good way of assessing overall performance and direct measures of quality may be more useful. Overall management score Notes: All information is from survey responses, apart from the number of competitors, which is derived from information on the population of agencies/ homes and the ratings (low/ high performer) which are obtained from the industry regulators.
Appendix B MANAGEMENT PRACTICE INTERVIEW GUIDE: FOSTER/ADOPTION AGENCIES LEAN MANAGEMENT
(1) Standardisation of processes Tests how well processes are structured and standardized -focusing on matching of children with foster carers/ adoptive parents a. Can you briefly describe the process for finding a suitable foster carer / potential adoptive parent (need to tailor to agency) for a particular child? How formally is this defined and/or standardised? b. How do you identify and then deal with the diverse needs of individual children? How much flexibility does a case worker/manager have to move outside the protocol? c. How do you ensure that the process is followed in each case? That is, how is it evaluated/ reviewed? d. How do you define whether the match between the carer/ potential adoptive parent (need to tailor to agency) and the child has been successful? Score 1 Score 3 Score 5
Scoring grid: Unable to articulate a clearly defined process; no protocols for ensuring that the process is followed or that the outcome is successful Processes are in place, but there is little monitoring and/or attempt to validate outcomes.
The agency has adopted a clearly defined process that is able to deal with diverse needs; processes are followed with comprehensive monitoring/ oversight and follow-up to ensure that outcomes are successful
(2) Continuous improvement
Tests process for and attitudes to continuous improvement and whether there is a process for learning and for innovating a. When a problem occurs, (for example one arising with a child placed with foster carers/ adoptive parents), how do such problems typically become exposed and then fixed? b. Can you talk me through the process to deal with a recent problem that you faced? Were there any changes to procedures as a result (NOTE: may not apply to all problems mentioned…) c. Performance is continuously tracked and communicated against most critical measures, both formally and informally, to all staff using a range of visual management tools Performance is reviewed infrequently or in an un-meaningful way e.g. only success or failure is noted Performance is reviewed periodically with both successes and failures identified. No clear follow up plan is adopted.
Performance is continually reviewed, based on the indicators tracked. All aspects are followed up to ensure continuous improvement.
(5) Performance dialogue
Tests the quality of review conversations a) How are these performance review meetings structured OR How is the agenda for review meetings structured determined? b) When you get together, do you generally find that you do have enough information on performance data? How is this data used? c) When a problem is discussed during these meetings, how do you identify the root cause? Scoring grid: Top staff's main focus is on short term targets There are short and long term goals for all levels of the organisation. As they are set independently, they are not necessarily linked to each other Long term goals are translated into specific short term targets so that short term targets become a 'staircase' to reach long term goals (10) Target stretch Tests whether targets are appropriately difficult to achieve a) How tough are your targets? Do you feel pushed by them? b) On average, how often would you say that you meet your targets? c) Do you feel that all teams of staff are equally pushed in meeting their targets? Or do some groups get easier targets?
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5
Scoring grid: Goals are either too easy or impossible to achieve, at least in part because they are set with little involvement of key staff, e.g., simply off historical performance
In most areas, senior staff push for aggressive goals based, e.g., on external benchmarks, but with little buy-in from clinical staff. There are a few sacred cows that are not held to the same standard Goals are genuinely demanding for all parts of the organisation and developed in consultation with senior staff, e.g., to adjust external benchmarks appropriately
(11) Clarity and comparability of targets
Tests how easily understandable performance measures are and whether performance is openly communicated a) If I asked your staff directly whether they had been given individual performance targets, what would they tell me? b) Do people think about how their performance compares to the performance of other people? How would they be able to make any assessment of their relative performance? c) Do you compare or rank staff performance in any way?
Score 1
Score 3 Score 5
Scoring grid: Performance measures are complex and not clearly understood, or only relate to government targets. Individual performance is not made public Performance measures are well defined and communicated; performance is public at all levels but comparisons are discouraged Performance measures are well defined, strongly communicated and reinforced at all reviews; performance and rankings are made public to induce competition
TALENT MANAGEMENT (12) Rewarding high performers
Tests whether good performance is rewarded proportionately a) How does your appraisal system for staff work? b) Do you also operate an appraisal system for foster carers? If so, how does that system work? c) How do you reward your best performers, financially and non-financially? How about foster carers (if relevant)? d) Overall, how does your reward system compare to that at other comparable organisations? Score 1 Score 3 Score 5
Scoring grid: Not much systematic appraisal and people are rewarded equally irrespective of performance level
There is an evaluation system for the awarding of performance related rewards at the individual level; these are mainly non-financial and rewards are always or never achieved
There is an evaluation system for the awarding of performance related rewards, including personal financial rewards Changes are noticed, implemented regularly but there are few documented and formal systems to control this process.
Changes were made to improve overall performance, based on client needs and profile, and financial, with buy-in from all affected staff groups. The changes were communicated in a coherent 'change story' with a structured, pro-active mechanism for transmitting, recording and acting on this data.
(19) Rationale for introducing operational improvements
Tests motivation and impetus behind changes to operations and how the change story was communicated a) Has the main care management process changed in the recent years? How frequently do these changes occur? b) What is the main rationale for making operational improvements to the care management process or pathway? Can you give me a recent example? c) Who typically drives these changes?
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5
Scoring grid: Changes were imposed in a top down manner or because others were making (similar) changes, rationale was not communicated or understood
Changes were made because of financial pressure and the need to save money or as a (short-term) measure to achieve government and/or external targets
Changes were made to improve overall performance, both clinical and financial, with buy-in from all affected staff groups. The changes were communicated in a coherent 'change story' Scoring grid:
We do little to try and keep our top talent We usually work hard to keep our top talent We do whatever it takes to retain our top talent across all three staff groups (37) Attracting talent Tests how strong the employee value proposition is a) What makes it distinctive to work at your care home, as opposed to another, similar care home? b) Suppose I was a well-qualified potential staff member that you wanted to hire, how would you persuade me to come and work for your organisation?
Scoring grid: Our competitors offer stronger reasons for talented people to join their care homes
Our value proposition to those joining our department is comparable to those offered by other care homes
We provide a unique value proposition to encourage talented people join our department above our competitors
